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INTRODUCTION 
Children are perhaps America’s most precious, yet 
vulnerable members of society.  Their innocence and naivety 
leave many susceptible to pedophiles, who wish to exploit 
children for their own perversions. As a result, Congress 
enacted strict laws to shield children from sexual exploitation 
and to prosecute those responsible for such atrocities. In 
Miller v. California, the Supreme Court held that 
pornography depicting children “may be proscribed regardless 
of whether the images ‘taken as a whole’ appeal to ‘prurient 
interests’ or ‘have serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value.’”1  Despite the Court’s ruling in Miller in 
1973, Congress failed to enact a federal statute prohibiting 
the use of children in the production of sexually explicit 
materials until 1977.2  Recognizing that children were being 
exploited for pornography and suffering harm, Congress 
enacted the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq., in May 
of 1977.3  Despite this Act, child pornography remains 
pervasive throughout the United States.  In fact, child 
pornography is currently a billion dollar industry.4 
Congress’s failure to eradicate child pornography can be 
attributed in part to the inconsistent applications of child 
pornography laws, including § 2251.  Under § 2251, any 
person who employs or entices a minor to engage in sexually 
explicit conduct for the depiction of such conduct is in 
violation of the law.5  Under § 2256, the term sexually explicit 
is defined as the “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic 
 
 1.  James E. Bristol, Free Expression in Motion Pictures: Childhood Sexuality and 
a Satisfied Society, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 333, 352-53 (2007) (citing Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). 
 2. Id. at 342; see S. Rep. 95-438 at 1. Act became law under Pub. L. No. 95-225 
(1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2251-2252, 2256 (2006)). 
 3.  See Bristol, supra note 1, at 342; 18 U.S.C. § 2251. 
 4.  Allison L. Cochran, Punishment for Virtual Child Pornography. . .It’s Just A 
Fantasy, 2 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished comment, on file with BePress), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/allison_cochran. 
 5.  18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2012). 
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area of any person.”6  Today, several circuits use a non-
exhaustive, common law, totality of the circumstances test 
known as the “Dost Factor Test” to identify lasciviousness, 
and thus, sexual explicitness.7  However, United States v. 
Johnson exposes the problems that can result in applying 
Congress’s child pornography standards and the Dost Factor 
Test.8 
In Johnson, a weightlifting coach filmed his minor 
weightlifters in the nude.9  Both the district court and circuit 
court applied the Dost Factor Test to determine the presence 
of lasciviousness in the videos.10  Focusing on the content of 
each video, Judge Richard E. Dorr of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Missouri held that 
the videos of each minor depicted mere nudity, not 
lasciviousness or sexual explicitness.11  Thus, the district 
court acquitted Scott A. Johnson of charges of sexual 
exploitation of children in violation of § 2251.12  However, the 
United States appealed the district court’s decision, and a 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, finding Mr. 
Johnson guilty of violating § 2251 by filming child 
pornography.13  The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion written by 
Judge David R. Hansen, held that the district court erred by 
focusing on whether the videotapes themselves were actually 
lascivious; Mr. Johnson’s intent and the context in which the 
images were created were sufficient to violate § 2251.14 
Despite its implementation across a number of circuit 
courts, the Dost Factor Test applying § 2251 uses ambiguous 
language, forcing jurors to engage in the disturbing process of 
analyzing potentially pornographic material, and it results in 
inconsistent applications that focus on either the content or 
the intent behind such images.  First, the term lascivious, 
which is used to define child pornography under § 2251, 
 
 6.  18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (2012). 
 7.  United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986). 
 8.  See generally United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Mo. 2010), 
rev’d, 639 F.3d 433, 438 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 9.   See Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1091. 
 10.  See id. at 1096; Johnson, 639 F.3d at 439.  
 11.  See Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. 
 12.  See id. at 1089. 
 13.  See Johnson, 639 F.3d at 438. 
 14.  See id. at 438-39. 
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problematically varies in meaning among the different 
circuits.15  Factors that are regularly applied with the Dost 
Factor Test, such as “sexually suggestive” and “sexual 
coyness,” are vague and often reshaped based on the differing 
experiences of individual jury members.16  Second, society’s 
commercialization of a child’s sexuality renders it nearly 
impossible for jurors to properly apply the fact-sensitive Dost 
Factor Test and to discern lawful images of children from 
pornography.17  Professors Amy Adler and Robert J. Danay 
even assert that the Dost Factor Test’s requirement for courts 
and jurors to scrutinize images of naked children contributes 
to society’s sexual exploitation of children.18  Third, several 
federal court decisions have skewed the application of the 
Dost Factor Test by applying either only content-based or 
intent-based factors to their analysis.  Robert J. Danay 
explains that Dost Factor Test decisions focusing solely upon 
the content of images fail to reach images that may seem 
fairly innocuous, yet were created by a pedophile with 
perverse intentions.19  On the other hand, a Dost Factor Test 
 
 15.  One authority summarizes some of the problems:  
[U]nder Ferber lascivious describes the child’s conduct, not necessarily the 
child. On the other hand, Knox held that lascivious describes depictions 
“presented by the photographer . . . to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of 
a voyeur.” Under this interpretation, lascivious describes the viewer. In 
United States v. Wiegand, the Ninth Circuit held that lascivious should be 
interpreted from the perspective of the “audience that consists of [the 
filmmaker] or likeminded pedophiles.” So lascivious describes not only the 
viewer (including pedophiles), but also the filmmaker. But how does one 
interpret lascivious from the perspective of the pedophile? Interpretation of 
what lascivious describes harkens back to Justice Stewart’s explanation of 
obscenity: I know it when I see it. 
 See Bristol, supra note 1, at 353-54: 
 16.  Id. at 355. 
 17.  See id. at 364 (citing ANNE HIGONNET, PICTURES OF INNOCENCE: THE HISTORY 
AND CRISIS OF IDEAL CHILDHOOD 133, 153 (1998)). 
 18.  Robert J. Danay, The Danger of Fighting Monsters: Addressing the Hidden 
Harms of Child Pornography Law 11 REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES 151, 156 
(2005); Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Childhood Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
209, 210 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, The Perverse Law]. 
 19.  As Danay states: 
In an effort to condemn all materials that might hold some special inciting 
effect upon alleged pedophiles, the judicial pedophilic gaze is extending to 
materials that are increasingly mundane. This trend is all the more 
distressing given the evidence of certain professed pedophiles who claim to 
prefer more innocent representations of children.
 
For these people, it may be 
the very ‘sexual naïvete’ of the depicted children that is arousing . . . . If this is 
so, the judicial search for pedophilic material threatens to publicly sexualize 
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analysis centering exclusively upon the creator’s intent could 
qualify virtually any image of a child as pornography.20 
To resolve these issues, triers of fact should be required to 
balance both content-based and intent-based factors during a 
Dost Factor Test analysis. This requirement would guard 
against triers of fact applying only those factors that support 
their personal opinions toward the defendant in the case 
before them.  Also, this heightened standard offers a greater 
level of assurance that an image was properly found 
lascivious.  Moreover, this standard will remain organic, 
allowing the definition of the term lascivious to reshape as 
society’s standards change. Finally, this new requirement will 
allow courts to refine concepts as to what images constitute 
lasciviousness and what images do not. 
This comment will first explain the meaning and 
application of § 2251, the Dost Factor Test, and the different 
holdings of the district court and court of appeals in United 
States v. Johnson.  The following section will explore the 
criticisms that plague the Dost Factor Test, including its 
vagueness, misapplication, and its unintended promotion of 
the sexualization of children.  Finally, this comment offers a 
solution that will allow judges and juries to apply the Dost 
Factor Test effectively by requiring a balance of both content-
based and intent-based factors during the test’s 
implementation. 
I. DECIPHERING 18 U.S.C. § 2251, THE DOST FACTOR TEST AND 
UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 
A. § 18 U.S.C. 2251 and the Dost Factor Test 
Congress’s concern with the growth of commercial child 
pornography led it to enact 18 U.S.C. § 2251 in 1977.21  Since 
that time, the Act has been amended several times to 
strengthen its protection over America’s children.22  In 1984, 
1986, and most recently in 1988, Congress expanded the 
statute’s reach by raising the age of those defined as minors, 
 
all images of children no matter how innocuous the context. 
Danay, supra note 18, at 156-57. 
 20.  See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 956 
(2001) [hereinafter Adler, Inverting the First Amendment,]. 
 21.  See Bristol, supra note 1, at 342. 
 22.  See Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 956. 
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extending provisions to reach offenders who print and publish 
child pornography, and increasing the penalties for 
conviction.23  Under the current § 2251, “[a]ny person who 
employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any 
minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct 
shall be punished as provided under subsection (e).”24  Under 
§ 2256, sexually explicit conduct is defined as: sexual 
intercourse; bestiality; masturbation; sadistic or masochistic 
abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genital or pubic area of a 
person. 25 
Focusing on this final category, while neither § 2251 nor § 
2256 explicitly define lascivious, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits have each adopted a holistic test to assess whether 
material involving a child is lascivious, and, thus, sexually 
explicit under § 2251.26  The applicable test originated in the 
Southern District of California case United States v. Dost.27  
Under this test, “[c]ourts consider a non-exhaustive list of 
factors in determining whether a depiction meets the category 
of ‘lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.’”28  
Factors considered may include: 
(1) whether the focal point is on the minor’s genitals or pubic area; 
(2) whether the picture’s setting is sexually suggestive, i.e. in a 
place associated with sexual activity; (3) whether considering the 
minor’s age, the minor is depicted in an unnatural pose or in 
inappropriate attire; (4) whether the minor is partially clothed or 
nude; (5) whether the picture suggests sexual coyness or a 
willingness to engage in sexual activity and; (6) whether the 
picture is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response from the 
viewer.29 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 438 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2256 (2012)). 
 25.  § 2256. 
 26.  See United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986). For 
applications of the Dost Factor Test see United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 
1989); United States v. Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2009); Shoemaker v. Taylor, 
730 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 27.  See generally Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828. 
 28.  United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1094 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (citing 
Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828). 
 29. Id. (citing Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828). Because the Dost Factor Test’s list of 
applicable criteria is non-exhaustive, the district court in Johnson added the additional 
factor of whether the picture depicts the minor as a sexual object. 
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The decision is based on a totality of the circumstances, 
and not all of these factors need be present to find a 
“lascivious exhibition of the genital or pubic area.”30  
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit has held that “[i]mages or 
exhibitions of female breasts and the buttocks of either 
gender are not within the purview of § 2251(a),” and therefore 
not lascivious. 31 
B. Applying the Dost Factor Test to United States v. Johnson 
1. Johnson the Coach or Johnson the Pedophile? 
While the Dost Factor Test serves to define lascivious 
under § 2251, its application in both the district and circuit 
court decisions in United States v. Johnson highlights its 
severe deficiencies and reveals its need for restructuring. 
Mr. Johnson served as a weightlifting coach at a 
specialized facility for young athletes located in Springfield, 
Missouri.32  He had been involved in weightlifting 
competitions as both a participant and as a coach.33  In fact, 
he served as a women’s weightlifting coach at the 2004 
Olympic Games and refereed national weightlifting 
competitions.34 
In the sport of weightlifting, participants compete in 
classes based upon their body weight.35  Weightlifting coaches 
record a lifter’s weight through frequent weigh-ins in 
preparation for competitive events.36  Prior to a competition, 
each participant stands on a scale and “weighs in” in either 
the nude or underwear. 37  A referee of the same gender 
conducts the weigh-in.38  On several occasions, Johnson 
 
 30.  Steven L. Grasz, Child Pornography and Child Nudity: Why and How States 
May Constitutionally Regulate the Production, Possession, and Distribution, of Nude 
Visual Depictions of Children, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 609, 622 (1998) (quoting Dost, 636 F. 
Supp. at 832). 
 31.  United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 438 (8th Cir. 2011); see also United 
States v. Gleich, 397 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]aking pictures of a non-pubic area 
such as the buttocks does not meet the definition of “sexually explicit conduct.”). 
 32.  Johnson, 639 F.3d at 435. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 435-36. 
 35.  Id. at 436. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Johnson, 639 F.3d at 436. 
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instructed female athletes to enter an examination room, 
disrobe completely, and weigh themselves.39  The females 
were unaware that Johnson had set up a hidden video camera 
to film their weigh-ins.40  Johnson had placed the camera 
between two shelves, limiting its vertical view, yet preventing 
its discovery. 41 At least two female athletes were minors at 
the time Johnson filmed them.42  When authorities found the 
videotapes in Johnson’s home, he confessed to investigators 
that he filmed the girls without their knowledge, because he, 
“just wanted to film them . . . [and] see them naked.”43  A 
grand jury indicted Johnson on ten counts of sexual 
exploitation of a minor under § 2251.44 
2. The Videotapes 
At trial, the jury assessed eight videos filmed by Mr. 
Johnson, each video representing an alleged violation of 
§ 2251.45  The first count stated, “[t]he scale faces the table, 
such that when a person stands on it, a side view is captured.  
The minor enters the room, undresses completely, weighs 
herself, and redresses.”46 While this view shielded the minor’s 
pubic region, the video showed the minor from just below her 
shoulders to her calves.47  Under the second count, “[t]he scale 
faces the table.  The minor disrobes outside of the camera’s 
view.  The minor weighs herself naked, giving the camera a 
side view from just above her breasts to her calves.” 48  
However, the video did not clearly show the minor’s pubic 
area and captured no frontal nudity.49  Under the third count, 
“[t]he scale faces the wall opposite the camera, such that the 
camera captures a rear view of the person standing on the 
scale. The camera’s zoom appears to be increased.”50  While 
the minor weighed herself naked and the frame showed from 
 
 39.  United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1091 (W.D. Mo. 2010). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 1092. 
 42.  Id. at 1091. 
 43.  Id. at 1092.  
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id.  
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her left buttocks to just below her knee, the image captured 
no frontal view.51  Under the fourth count, even though the 
victim was completely naked at the time, only a side view was 
visible.52  Under the fifth count, not only did Johnson face the 
scale toward the table, but he also enhanced the camera’s 
zoom to a similar degree as the video in the fourth count.53  
The video showed a female wearing red workout shorts, and 
therefore no frontal nudity.54  Under the sixth count, the 
frame showed the scale facing the table.55  While the minor re-
dressed mostly outside of the camera’s view, the frame 
showed the nude minor from just above her breasts to her 
calves. 56  In addition, the far left side of the frame briefly 
showed the minor’s pubic region.57  Under the seventh count, 
the frame showed a side view of the minor from her upper 
back to her calves.58  Under the eighth count, the scale 
directly faced the camera.59  The minor weighed herself three 
separate times: once fully clothed, once only wearing 
underwear and a bra, and once only wearing underwear.60  
The video showed the minor from her shoulders to her 
calves.61 
Two of the victims testified that they were between the 
ages of fifteen and seventeen at the time Johnson filmed 
counts one, three, four, five, and eight.62  However, there was 
no evidence that Johnson tried to enhance the videos by 
freeze framing any of the images.63  On December 16, 2009, 
after analyzing the videos using the Dost Factor Test, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict on all eight counts of attempted 
sexual exploitation of a minor under § 2251(a) and (e).64  
Johnson’s sentence would carry a minimum of fifteen years in 
 
 51.  Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. 
 52.  Id. at 1093.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. 
 64.  Id. at 1093. 
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prison.65  However, Judge Dorr granted Mr. Johnson’s motion 
for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict and found that he 
had not violated § 2251 under any of the counts.66 
3. The Western District Court of Missouri’s Refusal to 
Look Beyond the Four Corners of the Image 
In providing his analysis using the Dost Factor Test, 
Judge Dorr disregarded Mr. Johnson’s sexual intentions and 
chose to focus solely on the content of each video.  The Judge 
held that “[a]though this Court believes Mr. Johnson’s 
conduct should not go unpunished, the Court finds § 2251(a) 
was not intended to apply to Mr. Johnson’s conduct,” which 
consisted only of mere nudity.67  Judge Dorr emphasized that 
the crime charged against Mr. Johnson is limited specifically 
to a video depiction of a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or pubic area. . .”68  He also turned to the American Heritage 
Dictionary, which defines the term lascivious as “of or 
characterized by lust, lewd, [or] lecherous.”69  Relying upon 
this definition, Judge Dorr opined that mere nudity could in 
no way be considered a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or 
pubic area.”70 
To distinguish lasciviousness from mere nudity, the 
district court first looked to United States v. Rivera.71  There, 
the Second Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find 
images showing a minor female lying naked with her legs 
spread and the camera focusing on her pubic area are 
unquestionably lascivious, because they serve to elicit a 
sexual response in the viewer.72  The district court also cited 
United States v. Horn, where the court held that freeze-
framing portions of videotape to expose the pubic areas of 
young girls indicates lascivious conduct under the Dost Factor 
Test.73  Distinguishing these cases from the facts at hand, 
Judge Dorr opined that the content of the videos taken by 
 
 65.  Id. at 1091. 
 66.  See generally id. 
 67.  Id. at 1091. 
 68.  Id. at 1093 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2) (2012)). 
 69.  Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 72.  Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (citing Rivera, 546 F.3d at 250). 
 73.  Id. at 1096 (citing United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
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Johnson constituted mere nudity.74  In his reasoning, Judge 
Dorr stated, “[t]here was no evidence in this case of freeze 
framing nor was there evidence that zoom enhancement made 
the minors’ genitals or pubic area the focus of the depiction.”75  
Johnson did not alter the camera’s zoom, placement, or scale 
to make the minors’ pubic areas the focal point of the video.76  
In addition, Judge Dorr remained unconvinced that a video 
showing a nude female from her lower back to just below her 
knees was intended to target a minor’s pubic area.77  Finally, 
Judge Dorr highlighted the fact that Johnson never told the 
two girls to pose in a certain way or to wear certain 
suggestive clothing during weigh-ins.78 
Secondly, the district court determined that the videos 
were not made with a sexual intent.  These videos 
indisputably depicted two minors “taking off their clothes, 
stepping onto a scale, getting off the scale, dressing, and 
leaving the room.”79  But, because these two minors were 
filmed engaging only in the non-sexual acts requested by 
Johnson, they were not portrayed with the intent of being 
sexual objects, as when pictures of children are uploaded onto 
a website devoted to sexual images. 80  Therefore, the videos 
were not intended to elicit a sexual response in viewers any 
more than mere nudity would elicit.81  Furthermore, Judge 
Dorr extended the scope of his opinion, asserting that 
“[r]egardless of all the Government argument about Mr. 
Johnson’s intent and what he attempted to gain, it is clear 
from the end product –  the videos –  that he failed to actually 
produce a visual depiction of a ‘lascivious exhibition of the 
[minors’] genitals or pubic area.”82 
Finally, the district court explained that the actions of Mr. 
Johnson did not violate § 2251 because the minors did not 
suffer any damage.  Judge Dorr held that “[t]he females were 
in an organized weightlifting program, Mr. Johnson was their 
 
 74.  See id. at 1093. 
 75.  Id. at 1097. 
 76.  Id. at 1096-97. 
 77.  Id. at 1096. 
 78.  Johnson, F. Supp. 2d  at 1097. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. (citing United States v. Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649, 660 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that a minor was portrayed as a sexual object when the images were 
primarily sexual in subject and were uploaded to a website devoted to sexual images)). 
 81.  Id. at 1097. 
 82.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (2012)). 
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coach, and it was undisputed that weighing in the nude was a 
common practice with weight lifters.”83  Judge Dorr noted that 
from the viewpoint of the minor females, they were not asked 
to do anything unusual.84  Until the girls realized they had 
been videotaped, they had no reason to be upset. 85  As a 
result, the district court granted Mr. Johnson’s motion for 
acquittal notwithstanding the jury’s verdict of guilty.86 
4. The Eighth Circuit’s Focus on the Intent Over the 
Content of the Videotapes 
Upon review, a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found Johnson guilty of 
violating § 2251 in an opinion that deemphasized the videos’ 
contents and stressed the Defendant’s sexual intentions.87  
Judge Hansen found the district court’s analysis to be 
misplaced.88  First, the Eighth Circuit distinguished between 
images constituting mere nudity and images rising to the 
level of lasciviousness.89  Judge Hansen agreed that “[m]ore 
than mere nudity is required before an image can qualify as 
‘lascivious’ within the meaning of the statute [§ 2256].”90  
However, he stressed that lascivious images provide more 
than just a clinical view of the portions of a child’s anatomy.91  
Relying upon the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Knox to explain the concept of “mere nudity,” Judge Hansen 
opined that surely “no one seriously could think that a Renoir 
painting of a nude woman or an innocuous family snapshot of 
a naked child in the bathtub violates the child pornography 
laws.”92  However, lasciviousness may exist even when a 
child’s genitals are only partially exposed.93 
 
 83.  Id. at 1094. 
 84.  Johnson, F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
 85.  Id. at 1094. 
 86.  Id. at 1100. 
 87.  See generally Johnson, 639 F.3d at 433. 
 88.  Id. at 439. 
 89.  See id. at 440. 
 90.  Id. (quoting United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 645-46 (8th Cir. 
2002)).  
 91.  Id. at 439 (citing Kemmerling, 285 F.3d at 646). In Kemmerling, the court 
distinguished images depicting the genitalia of young males, which were labeled as 
lascivious, from those that could be classified as depicting only mere nudity. 
 92.  Id. (quoting United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 93.  Knox, 32 F.3d at 744. 
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Using this distinction between mere nudity and 
lasciviousness in his Dost Factor Test analysis of the videos, 
Judge Hansen opined that the minors were portrayed as 
sexual objects.94  First, Judge Hansen emphasized the 
camera’s focus and zoom, stating that a reasonable jury could 
find that Johnson had adjusted the zoom to tighten the focus 
of the camera on the area where the females’ genitals would 
have been had they been facing the lens, thereby fulfilling the 
first Dost Factor (whether the focal point is on the minor’s 
genitals or pubic area).95  In at least one video, the camera’s 
focus had been so “zoomed in” that the left half of the female’s 
body from her left buttock down to her knee filled half of the 
screen.96  Had the female been facing the camera instead of 
away from it, the camera would have filmed a close-up view of 
her naked pubic area.97  Second, Judge Hansen opined that a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that, because the videos 
show the girls from their shoulders to their calves, including 
naked breasts, the facial features of the girls were of little or 
no importance to Johnson.98  Finally, Judge Hansen indicated 
that “[s]ome of the clips [do] clearly reveal the pubic areas of 
the young women not only as they stand on the scale facing 
the camera, but also as they go through the motions required 
to remove all of their clothing and put it back on.”99  Thus, 
because of where the camera was focused, the images of the 
girls could not reasonably be compared to innocent family 
photos, clinical depictions or works of art.100 
Judge Hansen then stated that to find a violation of § 
2251, the lascivious act need not be committed by the child, 
but by the alleged perpetrator.101  Demonstrating his point, he 
applied the Fifth Dost Factor that asks whether sexual 
coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity is 
present.102  According to Judge Hansen, the minors depicted 
in the videos were not acting in an obviously sexual manner, 
failing to demonstrate any coyness or willingness to engage in 
 
 94.  Johnson, 639 F.3d at. 440. 
 95.  Id.; United States v. Dost 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986). 
 96.  Johnson, 639 F.3d at 436-37. 
 97.  Id. at 437. 
 98.  Id. at 440. 
 99.  Id. at 437. 
 100.  Id. at 439. 
 101.  Id. at 440. 
 102.  Johnson, 638 F.3d at 440. 
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sexual activity.103  However, this does not necessarily indicate 
that the videos were not lascivious.104  In Horn, the Eighth 
Circuit held that ”lascivious exhibition need not necessarily 
be ‘the work of the child, whose innocence is not in question, 
but of the producer or editor of the video.’”105  Thus, even 
images of children acting innocently (such as the girls in this 
case) can be lascivious if they are intended to be sexual.106 
Judge Hansen also noted that all six Dost Factors do not 
need to be present for an image to be proscribed under § 
2251.107  Therefore, even though three Dost Factors (a 
sexually suggestive setting, inappropriate attire or unnatural 
poses, and a suggestion of sexual coyness) were not present in 
Mr. Johnson’s videos, a reasonable jury could still find that 
Mr. Johnson acted lasciviously.108  For example, the fact that 
the camera was specifically pointed at the scale, 
encompassing the minors’ nude bodies from their shoulders to 
below their knees, still weighed in favor of lasciviousness.109 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit held that statements made by 
the producer of the images must be considered in determining 
whether the images were meant to elicit a sexual response in 
the viewer.110  Judge Hansen considered that “[o]n at least one 
occasion after a lifter had come out from the examination 
room, he [Johnson] pointedly asked the young woman (age 15-
16) if she had stripped down completely.”111  Even more, when 
investigators asked Johnson why he had filmed the two 
minors he stated that “he thought they were ‘cute’ and that he 
was curious about what they looked like naked.”112  Johnson 
even admitted to police, “[M]y pervertedness got the best of 
me.”113  Based on Johnson’s statements and his other analysis, 
Judge Hansen held that a reasonable jury could find that 
Johnson intended the videos to be sexual in nature and to 
 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. (quoting United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
 106.  Id. at 439. 
 107.  Id. at 440 (citing United States v. Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649, 657 (8th Cir. 
2009)). 
 108.  Johnson, 638 F.3d at 440. 
 109.  Id. at 440-41. 
 110.  Id. at 441. 
 111.  Id. at 436. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
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elicit a sexual response in the viewer.114  The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals therefore reversed the district court’s 
decision to grant Mr. Johnson’s motion for acquittal 
notwithstanding the verdict.115 
II. THE DOST FACTOR TEST: A VAGUE, MISAPPLIED FACTUAL 
ANALYSIS THAT PROMOTES THE SEXUALIZATION OF CHILDREN 
While the Dost Factor Test is widely implemented by 
different circuits and supported by scholars, it has been 
subject to extensive criticism for its vague terms, its 
unintentional promotion of the sexualization of children, and 
its misapplication among the courts.  A number of 
commentators have supported the application of this test.  
Former Chief Deputy Attorney General of the Nebraska 
Attorney General’s Office Steven L. Grasz asserts that in 
order “[t]o fully protect children from psychological and 
emotional harm, states should enact legislation which 
restricts the production, distribution, and possession of nude 
visual depictions of children.”116  The Dost Factor Test, 
according to Grasz, accomplishes this goal by providing one of 
the clearest guides for federal courts to determine what types 
of materials should be proscribed under the Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act.117  Likewise, James 
E. Bristol opines that child pornography laws, including the 
Dost Factor Test, rightfully proscribe the abhorrent 
exploitation of children that originates from the production of 
“kiddy-porn.” 118  To Bristol, this test helps to eradicate one of 
 
 114. Johnson, 638 F.3d at 441 (citing United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 
646 (8th Cir. 2002)). Images designed to elicit a sexual response from the viewer are 
distinguishable from those designed to provide a clinical view of sections of a child’s 
anatomy.  
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Grasz, supra note 30, at 634. 
 117.  Id. at 623. This notion is illustrated by the number of cases that have followed 
the court’s holding in Dost. See e.g. United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 244-46 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (affirming the trial court’s use of Dost Factors in measuring the 
lasciviousness of a photo of a partially nude girl); United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 
117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) (adopting Dost Factors to determine whether photos of a nude 
boy are lascivious genital exhibitions); United States v. Mr. A, 756 F. Supp. 326, 328-29 
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (using Dost Factors to find that the genitalia of children were not 
lasciviously exhibited in photos taken by their parents). 
 118.  Bristol, supra note 1, at 348 (explaining that “kiddy porn” consists of motion 
pictures depicting sex crimes perpetrated against real children). 
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society’s worst crimes.119 
However, several critics believe the Dost Factor Test uses 
vague and confusing language, promotes the sexualization of 
children, and focuses too heavily on either the content of or 
the intent behind the images.  Even Bristol acknowledges the 
Dost Factor Test’s problems of visual interpretation, law 
application and product accessibility, which allow motion 
pictures with illegal depictions of children to enter the 
marketplace unnoticed.120  Triers of fact who must apply this 
test are often left wondering what exactly it is they are 
supposed to interpret.121  With such an immense amount of 
scrutiny, the Dost Factor Test must be reframed into a more 
coherent structure for judges and jurors across the United 
States. 
A. Vagueness and Discrepancy in the Dost Factor Test 
Scholars have criticized the United States’ child 
pornography laws, including both 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and § 
2256 (specifically the term lascivious) and the Dost Factor 
Test, due to their vagueness and resulting differences in 
interpretation.  For instance, § 2256 defines child 
pornography as “any visual depiction . . . of sexually explicit 
conduct involving a minor.”122  However, Allison Cochran 
explains that this language creates several gray areas for 
legal interpretation. 123  Because this definition requires the 
depicted minor to be engaged in sexual activity, Cochran asks 
whether a minor just standing in a picture in her 
underclothes or even naked can ever truly constitute sexual 
explicitness.124  Unfortunately, § 2256 and Congress provide 
no guidance as to how the courts should interpret its 
language. 
Critics also find § 2251 problematic, because the ambiguity 
in defining the term lascivious under § 2256 results in the 
inconsistent application of § 2251 against alleged offenders.  
As Bristol explains, photographs of a nude, partially nude, 
and even fully clothed child create quasi-legal scenarios, 
 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 363. 
 121.  Id. at 355. 
 122.  18 U.S.C. § 2256. 
 123.  Cochran, supra note 4, at 4. 
 124.  Id. 
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where the deciding factor turns on whether the child’s body 
was portrayed with lascivious intent.125  However, Bristol 
raises the question as to what exactly the term lascivious 
describes.126  To Bristol, the word lascivious could describe a 
multitude of elements including the child, the child’s act, the 
filmmaker’s intent, or even the viewer’s reaction.127 
Even worse, the circuit courts’ inconsistent applications of 
§ 2251 and the term lascivious provide little guidance for 
applying this statute’s terms.  For example, the Eighth 
Circuit in United States v. Kemmerling held that a picture is 
lascivious only when it is sexual in nature. 128  Thus, § 2251 is 
violated when a picture depicts a child nude, partially clothed, 
or when the focus of the image is the child’s pubic area.129  
However, distinguishing this definition, Bristol notes that in 
New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court held that § 2251 
prohibits lascivious images that “visually depict sexual 
conduct by children[.]”130  Likewise, Adler notes that in United 
States v. Knox, Solicitor General Drew Days made a similar 
argument, claiming lascivious must mean that the child is 
depicted as engaging in sexual conduct.131  However, the Third 
Circuit disagreed with Days, holding that lascivious has 
nothing to do with the actions of the child, but centers on 
whether the photographs serve to satisfy the sexual cravings 
of a voyeur.132  Bristol demonstrates that in applying § 2251 
one is left to ponder whether lascivious should be limited to 
describing the child (as held in Kemmerling), the conduct of 
the child (as held in Ferber and argued by Days in Knox), or 
the filmmaker’s intent.133  Such variances in defining 
lasciviousness demonstrate the need for circuit courts to 
adopt a more cohesive and reliable standard for proscribing 
child pornography and prosecuting those who violate § 2251. 
 
 125.  Bristol, supra note 1, at 351 (citing Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 583 
(1983)). 
 126.  Id. at 353-54. 
 127.  Id. at 354. 
 128.  285 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Bristol, supra note 1, at 354 (quoting New York v. Ferber, U.S. 747, 764 
(1982)). 
 131.  Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 954 (2001) (citing 
Brief for the United States at 9, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1995) (No. 92-
1183)). 
 132.  Id. (citing United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 133.  Bristol, supra note 1, at 354. 
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Furthermore, the Dost Factor Test’s vague terms, coupled 
with each trier of fact’s unique life experiences, make it nearly 
impossible to create a uniform, fact-intensive test for 
lascivious images.  Bristol raises the question; can a depiction 
be lascivious based upon the factors outlined in Dost? 134  
Considering the different Dost Factor Test elements applied 
by the courts, Bristol asks how elements such as “sexually 
suggestive,” “sexual coyness,” and “designed to elicit sexual 
response in the viewer” should be defined.135  According to 
Anne Higonnet, this question cannot be answered, because 
legal interpretations of these ambiguous terms slip and slide 
in each direction during attempts to unravel their ultimate 
meaning.136 Because such terms are open to multiple 
interpretations, it is no wonder the Western District of 
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Johnson 
drew such different conclusions regarding the lasciviousness 
of Johnson’s videos. 
Finally, the application of the Dost Factor Test’s elements 
may differ based upon a juror’s unique life experiences. 
Bristol explains that while some laws enjoy clarity and 
precision, interpreting images of children may never be 
ascribed these attributes.137  Whether a filmmaker, the public 
or a trier-of-fact, each individual will interpret from a sitz im 
leben, or a situation in life.138  Characteristics including 
cultural values, education, tolerance levels, politics, and even 
religious beliefs will only complicate a person’s 
interpretation.139  Thus, the vagueness of the Dost Factor 
Test’s terms and each trier of fact’s unique interpretation of 
such terms illustrate the need to adopt a more coherent test 
to identify lascivious images. 
B. The Dost Factor Test—A Sexualizer of Children 
Some scholars find the Dost Factor Test ineffective 
because it reinforces society’s captivation with the 
sexualization of children. They argue that the sexualization of 
children in society makes it difficult to determine an objective 
 
 134.  Id. at 354-55. 
 135.  Id. at 355 (citing United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)). 
 136.  Higonnet, supra note 17, at 161. 
 137.  Bristol, supra note 1, at 355. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
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test that can differentiate between lascivious and non-
lascivious content involving children.  Anne Higonnet opines 
that “eroticism in mainstream images of children . . . [and] 
sexualization of childhood is not a fringe phenomenon 
inflicted by perverts on a protesting society, but a 
fundamental change furthered by legitimate industries and 
millions of satisfied customers.”140  Children’s bodies advertise 
a plethora of society’s products including swimsuits, 
fragrances, clothing, electronics, and other commodities.141  
“Every industry based on the display of adult bodies spawns a 
juvenile counterpart.”142  In fact, Bristol notes that the 
clothing line Abercrombie began selling its catalogue because 
the provocative photos of its teenage models were so 
successful that the images became the commodity.143 
In another example of sexualizing children, Bristol 
describes how southern United States citizens are infatuated 
with child beauty pageants.144  “Little girls—some as young as 
three and four-years-old—are judged based solely upon 
appearance of makeup, hairstyle, and outfit—either bathing 
suit or evening gown.”145  This sexualization of children can 
make interpreting the Dost Factor Test difficult, allowing 
suspect depictions of children to go unnoticed and innocent 
and valuable depictions to be censored.146 
Furthermore, several critics claim the Dost Factor Test 
itself contributes to the sexualization of children.  According 
to Adler, the Dost Factor Test requires one to “evaluate the 
lasciviousness of the photographer and an ‘audience that 
consists of himself or like-minded pedophiles.’”147  Both Alder 
and Danay emphasize that the trier of fact must focus on the 
photographer’s peculiar lust and take on the gaze of the 
pedophile in order to flush out pictures of children that have 
pedophilic appeal. 148  To Adler, this requirement under the 
 
 140.  Higonnet, supra note 17, at 153. 
 141.  Id. at 144. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Bristol, supra note 1, at 364. 
 144.  Id. at 365 (citing C. Calvert, The Perplexing Problem of Child Modeling Web 
Sites: Quasi-Child Pornography and Calls for New Legislation, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 231 
(2004)). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 356. 
 147. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 954 (quoting United 
States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 148.  Id. at 954; Danay, supra note 18, at 154. 
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Dost Factor Test creates the daunting task for a layperson to 
ascertain a pedophile’s exact intent.  The difficulty and 
grotesqueness in such instructions were most evident in 
Foster v. Virginia, in which the Virginia Court of Appeals 
urged the jury to ascertain the intent of a man accused of 
committing necrophilia against children.149 
Likewise, Danay illustrates how the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Knox used its own pedophilic gaze 
to find that an image constituted the “lascivious exhibition of 
the genitals” despite the fact that the child was wearing 
attire.150  The Dost Factor Test required the Third Circuit to 
“carefully, explicitly, and publicly scrutinize the genital and 
pubic regions of clothed minors” in an effort to detect a 
picture’s sexually stimulating nature.151  To Danay, this test 
wrongfully places a “sexual child on public display while 
simultaneously condemning those who view children in such a 
manner.”152  Through cases such as Knox and Dost, Danay 
asserts that the American courts have become “unwitting 
cultural conduits and amplifiers,” to the portrayal of children 
as sexual objects.153  Such a flawed process for extinguishing 
child pornography inadvertently contributes in part to 
society’s inability to fully eliminate the problem.154 
C. The Dost Factor Test: All Image and No Intent or All Intent 
and No Image? 
Critics also assert that courts applying the Dost Factor 
Test rely too heavily on either the content of an image or the 
intent behind an image in deciding whether § 2251 has been 
violated.  On one hand, many critics claim judges and/or 
juries that rely too heavily upon content-based Dost Factor 
Test elements in their analysis fail to consider the pedophile 
who fulfills his perverse intentions with innocuous images of 
minors. For example, Adler explains how the Third Circuit 
 
 149.  Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 955 (citing Foster v. 
Virginia, No. 0369-87-2, 1989 WL 641956, at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1989)).  
 150.  Danay, supra note 18, at 155 (citing United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 744 
(3d Cir. 1994)). 
 151.  Id. at 155-56. 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id. at 156. 
 154.  Id. at 168 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1 
AN INTRODUCTION 264 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books, 1990 ed.) (1978)). 
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Court of Appeals misapplied the Dost Factor Test in United 
State v. Villard by holding that child pornography inheres in 
a photograph. 155  Similarly, the First Circuit in United States 
v. Amirault ruled it is unacceptable for the court to analyze 
beyond the four corners of a photograph, otherwise “a 
deviant’s subjective response could turn innocuous images 
into pornography.”156  However, this approach is problematic.  
As Danay explains, the sexual naïveté of a depicted child 
could be the arousing factor for pedophiles (emphasis 
added).157  For example, Danay indicates that a recent survey 
regarding members of the North American Man Boy Love 
Association (NAMBLA), an organization for pedophiles, 
revealed that its members derived erotic stimulation through 
watching the Disney Channel, mainstream films, and other 
networks that televise children.158  Hence, limiting a Dost 
Factor Test analysis to the four corners of an image restricts 
the prohibitive capabilities of § 2251 to an overly-narrow 
category of images. 
On the other hand, there are scholars who claim that 
triers of fact who focus too heavily on the intent-based 
elements of the Dost Factor Test wrongfully disregard the 
content of an image.  Bristol and Adler raise concerns that an 
intent-based application of the Dost Factor fails to consider 
society’s numbness to childhood sexuality and problematically 
encourages jurors to only consider the perspective of the 
alleged pedophile.  For example, Bristol notes that “as society 
continues to recognize expressive value in depictions of 
childhood sexuality, the more acceptable such expression 
becomes.”159  In fact, nude portrayals of children date back to 
the classics age, where children were depicted in Greek 
statues and Renaissance paintings.160  According to Bristol, 
“[p]eople may not be bothered [by the content of such images] 
because they have been fascinated by similar content for 
centuries.”161 
Even more, as Adler explains, several courts enforcing 
 
 155.  Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 957-58 (citing United 
States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
 156.  Id. at 958 (citing United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 157.  Danay, supra note 18, at 157. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Bristol, supra note 1, at 358. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
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child pornography laws have tended to approach the issue 
through the perspective of the pedophile.  This can be 
problematic, as pedophiles may be stimulated by images of 
nude children that have absolutely no sexual connotation.162  
For example, Bristol notes that in United States v. Moore, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed photographs of 
two young boys naked in the Australian wilderness.163  One 
photograph depicted a boy walking across a stream, while the 
other showed a boy climbing a tree.164  Although the court 
found that neither photo “appear[ed] to depict sexual activity 
or sexuality,” the court still concluded that the pictures 
seemed “designed to provoke a sexual response.”165  Likewise, 
Adler notes the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal’s 
decision in State v. Dixon, in which the defendant secretly 
filmed two young girls bathing.166  While the court recognized 
that the contents of the tape consisted of innocent and 
everyday activity, the defendant watched the tape before 
engaging in sexual relations with his adult girlfriend.167  
Therefore, in spite of the harmlessness of the images on the 
videotape, the defendant’s repugnant intent led the court to 
classify the contents of the videotape as child pornography.168  
As Adler asserts, when viewed from the perspective of 
pedophiles, all photos of children could be erotic in one way or 
another.169  Because the Dost Factor Test permits focusing 
exclusively on the intent behind the images in question, this 
application may proscribe images that would not be 
considered lascivious had their content also been examined. 
D. Suggestions from Scholars to Reform the Current Child 
Pornography Laws: 
While scholars have proposed a harm analysis test and an 
incitement test to reform America’s child pornography laws, 
each proposed remedy is an unrealistic “fix” for the law’s 
 
 162.  Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 959. 
 163.  Bristol, supra note 1, at 360 (citing United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 687 
(7th Cir. 2000)). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 959 (citing State v. 
Dixon, 01C01-9802-CC-00085, 1998 WL 712344 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1998)). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id.  
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deficiencies. Under the first suggested reform, the harm 
analysis test, Bruce Ryder recommends prohibiting the 
possession of materials containing images of children if the 
images caused “harm” to children in their production. 170  
Commenting on Ryder’s recommended reform, Danay notes 
that under this approach, child pornography should be limited 
to materials where children engage in “explicit sex acts.”171  
To Danay, Ryder’s proposed harm analysis test would refocus 
judicial attention on the express advocacy of harm, sexual or 
otherwise, to children, and not on the hidden prurient 
qualities inherent in particular impugned materials.172  
Proponents of this reform also assert that it would remind 
courts that child pornography laws are designed to prevent 
actual harm to children, not to conduct an analysis that may 
hazily send the message that sex with children may be 
pursued. 173 
However, critics of the harm analysis test, such as James 
Marsh, former executive director of the Children’s Law Center 
in Washington, D.C., stress that this reform disregards the 
concept that child pornography, in and of itself, causes 
personal injury to the child involved.174  For example, the 
Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber noted that “a child who 
has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the 
recording is circulating within the mass distribution system 
for child pornography.”175  According to the Supreme Court, 
the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the images 
secret have profound emotional repercussions upon 
children.176  Moreover, Professor Debra Burke states that 
there is substantial social evidence that persons who molest 
minors use such images as a tool, not only to arouse predatory 
lust, but also to seduce children.177  Under Ryder’s proposed 
test, pedophiles would be allowed to keep for their own 
 
 170.  Bruce Ryder, The Harms of Child Pornography Law, 36 U. OF B.C. L. REV. 101, 
114 (2003). 
 171.  Danay, supra note 18, at 186 (commenting on Ryder’s proposed harm analysis 
test). 
 172.  Id. at 187 (commenting on Ryder’s proposed harm analysis test). 
 173.  Id. at 187-88. 
 174.  James R. Marsh, Masha’s Law: A Federal Civil Remedy for Child Pornography 
Victims, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 459, 495 (2011). 
 175.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Debra D. Burke, Thinking Outside The Box: Child Pornography, Obscenity, 
and the Constitution, VA. J. L. & TECH. ¶ 58 (2003).  
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perversions images that fall short of causing what Ryder 
defines as “harm” to the child being exploited. 
In United States v. Johnson, the concerns expressed by 
Marsh and Burke would have come to fruition had a harm 
analysis test been applied.  Several times, Johnson told 
female athletes to go into an examination room, completely 
disrobe and weigh themselves.178  However, the females 
remained completely unaware that Johnson had set up a 
hidden video camera to film their weigh-ins. 179  In fact, 
Johnson hid the camera between two shelves, ensuring 
adequate cover.180  Under the proposed harm analysis test 
suggested by Ryder, the videos Johnson filmed would not 
meet the harm analysis test.  This is because no actual harm 
was caused to the minors and they were not forced to engage 
in explicit sexual acts.  Still, such a test ignores the principle 
that child pornography is inherently harmful to the child that 
it portrays.  This test does not consider the potential 
psychological harm to children, such as those in Johnson, 
which may result once the children have learned of the 
exploitive act committed against them.  As a result, Johnson 
would be free to retain, and even disseminate, the videos he 
created of the minors, despite the fact that he confessed to 
creating them with perverse intentions.181 
Under the second suggested reform, the incitement test, 
Burke calls for courts to evaluate the context of an image in 
order to determine if an incitement to imminent lawless 
activity exists (as was employed by the Supreme Court in 
Brandenberg v. Ohio182 in the First Amendment context). 183  
Explaining the proposed incitement test, Burke states that, 
“while it is unlikely that a mother who shows a picture taken 
of her child in the bathtub to a sister would be held 
accountable, a commercial provider of sexually explicit speech 
to a foreseeable pedophilic audience likely would be held 
accountable,” due to its prospect of inciting imminent 
lawlessness.184  However, even Burke is quick to explain that 
 
 178.  United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1091 (W.D. Mo. 2010). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 1092. 
 181.  See United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2011).  
 182.  395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the United States Constitution does not 
protect speech that serves to incite imminent lawless action). 
 183.  Burke, supra note 177, at ¶ 56. 
 184.  Id. 
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this approach does not fix all of the child pornography law 
issues.185  According to Burke, under the incitement test, 
“there is still no controlling for pedophiles who are aroused by 
the photos of children clad in underwear in clothing 
catalogues.”186 
Illustrating Burke’s concern for the proposed incitement 
test’s inability to proscribe innocuous images of children, the 
images in Johnson would not have been prohibited under 
such a test.  Much like an inoffensive catalogue portraying 
children in their underwear, the sport of weightlifting 
requires that coaches document a lifter’s weight through 
frequent weigh-ins for competitive events.187  Prior to a 
competition, each participant stands on a scale and “weighs 
in” in either the nude or in underwear.188  In addition, a 
referee of the same gender conducts the weigh-in.189  Under an 
incitement test, the fact that Johnson was drawn to images of 
such inoffensive and routine procedures in the sport of 
weightlifting would most likely render his conduct and the 
images he created legal.  Likewise, the images of each minor 
in Johnson could hardly be found to incite imminent lawless 
activity. The first count described that the video did not show 
the minor’s pubic region, but instead only portrayed the minor 
from just below her shoulders to her calves.190  Under the 
second count, no frontal nudity was evident. 191  Likewise, the 
third count only showed the minor from her left buttock to 
just below her knee.192  Finally, even under the fifth count, the 
video failed to show any nudity, depicting only a female in red 
workout shorts.193  Based upon these facts, the proposed 
incitement test would provide no protection for minors who 
were subjected to Johnson’s abuse of recording routine 
weightlifting procedures. 
 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 187.  Johnson, 639 F. 3d. at 436. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. at 1093. 
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III. BRINGING A TRUE BALANCE OF CONTEXT AND CONTEXT TO 
THE DOST FACTOR TEST 
A. The Misapplication of the Dost Factor Test in United States 
v. Johnson 
The conflicting decisions by the Western District Court of 
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Johnson demonstrate that the Dost Factor Test is 
ineffective in proscribing lascivious images of children.  Judge 
Dorr of the district court chose to focus his entire analysis on 
the content of the images in question, thus overturning the 
jury’s conviction of Johnson on all eight violations of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251.194  However, Judge Hansen of the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained that, while hardly any of the 
videos of the victims filmed a child’s pubic region, such 
images would have been captured had each child merely 
turned to face the camera.195  Based on the camera’s angle and 
admissions of Johnson, Judge Hansen opined that the 
Defendant’s sexual intent made the images lascivious, even if 
the images were unable to meet certain content-based 
factors.196  To prevent such discrepancies from arising in the 
future, the elements of the Dost Factor Test should be applied 
on an equal basis, where triers of fact are mandated to apply 
a balance of content-based and intent-based factors in their 
analysis as to whether an image constitutes lasciviousness. 
B. In Determining Lasciviousness, the Reformed Dost Factor 
Test Will Assess Both the Content of an Image and the 
Intent Behind Its Creation 
A novel suggestion to create a sense of uniformity in 
implementing the Dost Factor Test is to require that a 
mandatory balance of both content-based and intent-based 
Dost Factors be present in order to proscribe an image under 
§2251.  This new reading of the current Dost Factor Test will 
tend to insulate the Dost Factor Test analysis from the 
emotions of jurors and judges, who wish to apply only those 
factors that suit their predispositions.  In addition, the new 
 
 194.  See generally id. at 1089. 
 195.  Johnson, 639 F.3d at 436-37. 
 196.  Id. at 439-40.  
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Dost Factor Test will remain organic as technology and child 
pornography change over time.  Finally, it will allow courts to 
form distinct categories of images that are lascivious under 
society’s standards, and therefore proscribe them under § 
2251. 
First, the new Dost Factor Test will insulate the 
application of the law from the high emotions that often 
accompany child pornography cases.  By requiring that a 
balance of both content-based and intent-based factors be 
present in a Dost Factor Test analysis for an image to be 
lascivious, triers of fact will be restricted from applying only 
those factors that suit their predispositions toward the 
defendant.  Had this approach been used in United States v. 
Johnson, the Eighth Circuit would have been required to 
show not only that Mr. Johnson had a sexual intent (based 
upon the camera’s angle and testimony), but also that the 
image contained proscribed content (based on the images 
depicted in the videos). Even though these new requirements 
create a higher standard for prosecutors to meet, the newly 
proposed rule offers an extra level of assurance that the 
images were properly proscribed or accepted. 
Second, these new requirements for both content-based 
and intent-based factors can fluctuate in meaning based upon 
society’s standards of decency toward children.  Today, 
children are openly accepted as models in clothing lines and 
even arguably as sex symbols in the music and entertainment 
industry.  These are common occurrences that only a few 
decades ago were considered inappropriate.  For such reasons, 
it would be nearly impossible to reform the Dost Factor Test 
to contain completely objective factors with timeless 
interpretations.  Instead, implementing this new requirement 
will still allow the application of different Dost Factors to 
mold to society’s norms as time progresses.  For example, if 
the Dost Factor Test is applied to analyze the potential 
lasciviousness of an image, the content-based factors of 
“sexual coyness” or “sexually suggestiveness” may be selected 
by the judge to create a balance with the intent-based factors 
he or she also selects.  Critically though, the definition of 
what constitutes “sexual coyness” or “sexual suggestiveness” 
would be allowed to change as America’s culture evolves.  The 
new Dost Factor Test will never be outdated to assess 
potentially lascivious images.  In addition, the new Dost 
Factor Test’s adaptability will allow it to be applicable to new 
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technology, such as virtual child pornography.  Furthermore, 
the current Dost Factor Test is non-exhaustive, allowing 
judges to add and eliminate factors in their analysis as they 
deem necessary.197  This principle would remain intact under 
the new Dost Factor Test.  Nevertheless, under the new rule, 
there must always remain a balance between factors 
analyzing the content and factors analyzing the intent behind 
an image. 
Finally, these new requirements for the Dost Factor Test 
will gradually establish defined categories of lascivious 
images.  The freedom that courts are given in selecting which 
Dost Factor to apply have led to inconsistent rulings, as seen 
in United States v. Johnson.  Such decisions keep the public 
from understanding the meaning of lasciviousness and thus, 
understanding what types of images constitute sexually 
explicit conduct under § 2251.  However, with the court’s 
consistent implementation of a set of both content-based and 
intent-based factors, patterns of lascivious images will 
develop over time.  These patterns allow the public to 
understand what sorts of images cross the threshold into the 
territory of child pornography, even before the images are 
created.  Now, photographers and videographers will have a 
better understanding as to whether their proposed images 
will likely be considered a violation of § 2251.  Even more, 
such knowledge will turn the Dost Factor Test into a 
preventative measure against the sexual exploitation of 
children, rather than simply a retroactive test to assess the 
harm that has already damaged a child. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This new standard for the Dost Test, while perhaps more 
rigid than its current standard, will still allow for great 
flexibly as societal and cultural norms change over time.  In 
addition, a more rigid test will help to establish a uniform 
definition of the term lascivious during the time period in 
which the Dost Factor Test is applied.  Finally, these reforms 
will serve, to not only enhance the protection of children, but 
also to prevent the convictions of those who are, in fact, 
innocent of any violation under § 2251. 
 
 197.  Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (citing United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 
828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)). 
